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Case No. 950604-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(f), 1953 as
amended and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR
APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court committed error by failing to

conduct a colloquy on the record between the court and the
defendant to ensure that the defendant understood the risks of self
representation and thus the consequence of his waiver of his
constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
The standard for review for this issue is clearly erroneous
in examining whether the trial court's factual findings demonstrate
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whether the Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to counsel.

See State vs. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah App. 1993)

State vs. Drobel, 815 P.2d at 734.

When determining whether the

trial court applied the proper legal standard in reaching its
decision

to allow

standard is used.

self-representation

a

correction

of

error

See State vs. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah

App. 1990).
2.

Was the testimony1 of witnesses1 Brandon Gillis and Vicky

Green insufficient to support Defendant's conviction on the charge
of "impersonation of an officer."
The standard of review is clearly erroneous. See City of Orem
vs. Ko-Tuna Lee, 846 P.2d 450 (Utah App. 1993), State vs. Walker,
736 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory
process
for
obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.

2.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12:
[Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to
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testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases.
In no instance
shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise
entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is
limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by
statute. Nothing in this constitution
shall preclude the use of reliable
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or
rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
3.

Utah Code Annotated, §76-8-512, 1953 as amended:
Impersonation of an officer.
A person guilty of a class B
misdemeanor who:
(1) impersonates a public servant
or a peace officer with intent to deceive
another or with intent to induce another
to submit to his pretended official
authority or to rely upon his pretended
official act;
(2) falsely states he is a public
servant or a peace officer with intent to
deceive another or to induce another to
submit
to
his
pretended
official
authority or to rely upon his pretended
official act; or
(3) display or possesses without
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authority any badge, identification card,
other
form of
identification, any
restraint device, or the uniform of any
state of local government entity, or a
reasonable facsimile transmission of any
of these items, with the intent to
deceive another or with the intent to
induce another to submit to his pretended
official authority or to rely upon his
pretended official act.
4.

Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(a) A defendant charged with a
public offense has the right to self
representation, and if indigent, has the
right to court-appointed counsel if the
defendant faces a substantial probability
of deprivation of liberty.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Defendant/Appellant, Mike Reid will sometimes be referred

to as Defendant and the Plaintiff/Appellee, which is State of
Utah/West Valley City, will sometimes be referred to as State.
"R." refers to Record; and "Ex." refers to Exhibit.

"T.R."

refers to Trial Transcript.
A record of the proceedings in the trial court was made and
transcribed and filed with the trial court on or about January 2,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:

This is an action brought by the Plaintiff, State of Utah/West
Valley City against the Defendant Michael Reid wherein Reid was
charged in a formal information filed with the Third Judicial
Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, West Valley Department for
impersonation of an officer, a violation of Utah Code Annotated
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§76-8-512, 1953 as amended, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 1-6)
B.

Course of Proceedings:

This is an Appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, West Valley Department,
State of Utah before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, District
Court Judge, dated March 30, 1995, (R. 21) and said trial court's
subsequent denial of Defendant's Motion for New Trial on the 2nd
day of August, 1995 (R. 26).
C.

Disposition in Lower Court:

On the 30th day of March, 1995, a trial was held in the Third
Judicial Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, West Valley Department,
before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring. The State was represented
by West Valley Prosecutor, Keith Stoney and Defendant appeared
without counsel and represented himself. During the course of the
trial the State called three witnesses, a Mr. Brandon Gillis, his
mother, Vicky Lynn Green and Officer Coy Acocks of the West Valley
Police Department. At the conclusion of the State's testimony the
Defendant took the stand and testified on his own behalf.

At the

conclusion of the trial the Court found the Defendant guilty of the
charge set forth in the information filed in this matter, to-wit:
impersonation of an officer. (R. 21)
After the judgment and subsequent sentencing of the Defendant
on May 24, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial with the
trial Court on June 5, 1995 (R. 26). Thereafter the court denied
said motion by way of a memorandum decision rendered and signed on
August 3, 1995 (R. 46).
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STATEMENT OF FJCTS
On January 6, 1995 an information was filed in the Third
Judicial Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, West Valley Department,
State of Utah against the Defendant for impersonation of an officer
in

violation

of

Utah

Code

Annota. ad

§76-8-512, a

Class

B

misdemeanor (R. 1-6)• Said information was based upon the probable
cause statement of Brandon Gillis, Vicky Green and Officer Coy
Acocks of the West Valley Police Department who alleged the
Defendant, during a telephone conversetion with Brandon Gillis and
his mother, Vicky Green, represented that he was a police officer
with the West Valley Police Department and requested of Ms. Green
that Mr. Gillis1 pay for the damage to the security officer's tires
which had been slashed at the apartment complex by Mr. Gillis and
threatened that charges would be filed against Mr. Gillis if he
failed to pay.
After the aforementioned phone cell Ms. Green testified she
contacted the West Valley City Police Department and both her and
Mr. Gillis reported the incident and identified the Defendant as
the caller whereupon an investigation was conducted and charges
filed against the Defendant for impersonation of a police officer.
This matter came on for trial on March 30, 1995.

The court

called the case as one of a number set on its non-jury calendar.
When the Court called the matter as West Valley City vs. Reid the
Defendant responded and the Court confirmed that Mr. Reid was in
fact the Defendant (T.R. page 61, lines 2-4).

The Court then

instructed the Defendant where to sit in the court room and briefly
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explained the format for conducting the trial. At no time, did the
Court inquire of Mr. Reid whether he was representing himself or
whether his decision for self-representation was voluntary and had
been made knowingly and intelligently. Nor did the Court establish
that the Defendant understood the risks of declining legal counsel
(T.R. page 61).
After the Court explained the format of the trial the State
called its first witness Mr. Gillis who tescified that he received
a phone call on his pager on August 11, 1994, and "vaguely"
recognized the number as that of the Defendant. Mr. Gillis further
testified that subsequent thereto he called the number left on his
pager and that the party who answered the telephone answered the
call with the salutation, West Valley P.D.(T.R. page 73, lines 221). Mr. Gillis testified he recognized the voice of the person on
the phone as that of the Defendant based upon the previous
telephone call that he had with the Defendant (T.R. page 73, lines
7-9).

Mr. Gillis said that the caller requested his mother's work

phone number so that he could call her at work however, Mr. Gillis
indicated that his mother was at home and took the phone to his
mother who spoke with the caller (T.R. page 74, lines 1-13).

The

caller did not identify himself as a police officer nor did he
request anything of Mr. Gillis although later in his testimony
under leading and suggestive questioning by the prosecutor, Mr.
Gillis did testify that he believed the caller used the name of an
officer when he spoke with him (T.R. page 75, lines 8-18).
When Ms. Green was given the telephone, she spoke with the
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caller who she testified identified hi.iself as an Officer Briddem.
Ms. Green testified that the caller to id her that her son, Brandon
Gillis, had been accused of slashing tires &t the apartment complex
and that her son either needed to pay the security officer for his
tires which had been slashed or charges would be pressed (T.R. page
85, lines 2-12).

Prior to this incident Ms. Green had neither met

nor spoken with the Defendant (T.R. page 87, lines 6-8 and lines
17-18).
Green

The identification of the Defendant as the caller by Ms.
was

based

solely

upon

her

equivocal

recognition

of

Defendant's voice at the time of trial as that of the caller almost
8 months previous to August 11, 1994.
Based upon the testimony of these two witnesses and Officer
Acocks who testified that there was no Officer Briddem employed
with the West Valley Police Department, the Court found the
Defendant guilty of the charge of impersonation of an officer (T.R.
page 91, lines 18-25, T.R. page 92, lines 1-2).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial Court committed reversible error by failing to
conduct a colloguy with the Defendant to determine whether the
Defendant possessed adequate intelligence and knowledge about the
potential ramifications of voluntary self-representation. Second,
the clear weight of evidence in this case is against the verdict
rendered by the Court due to the uncertain and inconsistent
statements concerning the identification of the Defendant as the
perpetrator.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT MUST CONDUCT A COLLOQUY WITH A
DEFENDANT WHO CHOOSES SELF-REPRESENTATION AND THE
FAILURE TO DO SO CONSTITUTEJ REVERSIBLE ERROR
While the right to defend oneself in a criminal prosecution is
well established and protected under the jixth amendment to the
United

States Constitution and made applicable to the state

criminal prosecutions by the United States Supreme Court holding in
Faretta vs. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.ed 2nd
562

(1975) such right is also guaianteed by the Utah State

Constitution under Utah Constitution Article I, §12 and under Rule
8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Court has

mandated

that the

trial

However, our Supreme

Court must

scrutinize a

Defendant's invocation of this right since the exercise of selfrepresentation necessarily constitutes a waiver of the right to
counsel.
In State vs. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah App. 1993) this court
held:
"Inasmuch as the exercise of the
right
of
self-representation
necessarily constitutes a waiver of
the right to counsel, the trial
court has the duty, to determine
that a defendant has knowingly and
intelligently
chosen
selfrepresentation ."
The Court went on to say that while such a determination turns
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case
the Court must make this determination using a standard whereby the
Court can determine that the Defendant, with adeguate intelligence
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and

knowledge

about

the potential

chooses self-representation.

ramifications, voluntarily

Id. at 6 33.

The Court stated:

"The Defendant should be made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation so that the record will
establish that the Defendant knows what
he is doing and his choice is mrtde with
eyes open."
The Court in its analysis went on to say that the only way
that this can be accomplished

is

for the Court to conduct

penetrating questioning and that the preferred method would be a
colloquy on the record between the Court and the Defendant to
ascertain the basis of the waiver so as to ensure that the
Defendant understands the risks of self-representation.
633.

Id. at

In this regard the Court stated as follows:
"Generally this information can only be
elicited after penetrating questioning by
the trial court. Therefore, a colloquy
on the record between the court and the
accused is the preferred method of
ascertaining the validity of a waiver
because it ensures that defendants
understand
the
risks
of
selfrepresentation. Moreover, it is the most
efficient means by which appeals may be
limited."
This Court relying upon the holding in State vs. Drobel, 815

P.2d at 732 further stated that if the Defendant states that he
understands the disadvantages of self-representation and that the
decision is voluntary.... self-representation should be permitted.
Id. at 633. However, the Court went on to hold that unless a trial
court has determined that the Defendant has not knowingly and
intelligently chosen self-representation it must allow and honor
the Defendant's request of self-representation.

Id. at 633.

In
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this regard the Court held as follows:
"This precedent leads us to conclude that
unless a trial court appropriately finds
that a defendant has not knowingly and
intelligently chosen self-representation,
it must honor that defendant's choice.
The right to defend oneself is a
personal, constitutional right, which a
court should only deny if it finds that
the waiver of the right to counsel was
not made "knowingly and intelligently."
The decision in this case was appealed to the Supreme Court on
a writ of certiorari.

On appeal our Supreme Court upheld the

decision of this Court and reaffirmed that the trial Court must
conduct a colloguy with the Defendant and therein advise the
Defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
The Court also concurred that the trial Court's omission of such a
colloquy was not harmless error and should result in a remand of
the matter back to the trial Court for a new trial. See State vs.
Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993).
As to the facts at hand we note the record is completely
devoid of any such colloquy between the Court and the Defendant
wherein the Court attempted to ascertain whether the Defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and choose
self-representation.

The Court's failure to conduct

such a

colloquy is not harmless error therefore the matter should be
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
POINT II
THE VERDICT RENDERED IN THIS MATTER IS AGAINST THE
CLEAR WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IN THAT THE IDENTIFICATION OF
THE DEFENDANT IS VAGUE AND BASED UPON CONSISTENT TESTIMONY
Our Supreme Court has held that a verdict for a bench trial in
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a criminal case should not be overtu ~ned unless the verdict is
against the clear weight of evidence or if the Appellate Court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made and that this determination shall be made under a clearly
erroneous standard.

See State vs. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah

1987) .
Also, this Court later articulated in City of Qrem vs. Ko-Tung
Lee, 846 P.2d 450 (Utah App. 1993) that the Court in a bench trial
in a criminal case, must in rendering its verdict, make specific
findings of fact regarding its verdict. The Court held as follows:
"The standard of review for bench trials
in criminal cases is derived from Rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. That rule provides, in part:
In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the
court
shall
find
the
facts
specially...Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses."
Defendant was charged in this matter with impersonation of an
officer in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-8-512, 1953 as
amended.

Said provision reads in pertinent part as follows:
"A person is guilty
misdemeanor who....

of

a

class

B

(2) falsely states he is a public
servant or a peace officer with intent to
deceive another or to induce another to
submit
to
his
pretended
official
authority or to rely upon his pretended
official act"
Accordingly, the State must prove as the corpus delicti of
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this charge that the Defendant falsely stated that he was a peace
officer with the intent to deceive another or to induce another to
submit to his pretended official autt ority or to rely upon his
pretended official act.
In examining the facts in this matter v;e note that not only is
the evidence on its face insufficient to support the corpus delicti
of this charge but the Court's judgment and verdict is wanting in
its absence of any findings to support said verdict.
In the prosecution of this case the State relied exclusively
upon the testimony of two witnesses to establish the elements of
this offense, a Brandon Gillis and Mr. nillis1 mother, Vicky Green.
The testimony of these two witnesses failed to establish by any
credible

standard

that the perpetrator

of the call was the

Defendant.
First, Mr. Gillis testified that he received a call to his
pager on or about the 11th day of August, 1994.

Mr. Gillis then

claimed that he recognized the number on the pager as that of the
Defendants since the Defendant had allegedly called Mr. Gillis the
day before.

(T.R. page 63, lines 6 through 12).

Q

Did you get another page later?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

I do believe it was the next day.
And that would have been the 11th?

Is that the same day that you reported it to the

police, August 11th?
A

Yes.

It is.
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However, Mr. Gillis in later testimony equivocates as to his
prior identification of Defendant's telephone number on his pager
on August 11, 1994. His testimony in this regard was as follows:
(T.R. page 73, lines 2 through 18).
Q

Okay.

So you received a paga again on that day?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you call the number?

A

Yes.

Q

And who was on the other line?

A

They said it was West Valley P.D., but I recognized the

I did.

voice from the other time.
Q

Okay.

First of all, was it the same number you called

the day before?
A

The first number?

Q

Yes.

A

I vaguely remember, because I threw away the notes

because I did not think anything was going to happen with the case.
(Emphasis added).
Q

Do you think it was the first number?

A

Yes.

I do.

Mr. Gillis then testifies that he returns the call to the
number on the pager and that the caller upon answering Mr. Gillis'
call responds with the salutation of West Valley Police Department.
Mr. Gillis testified as follows:

(T.R. page 73, lines 19 through

21) .
Q

Okay. And there was a voice on the other line that said
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it was West Valley P.D.?
A

Yes.

Mr. Gillis then goes on in his testimony and claims that the
caller at no time stated that he was a police officer during his
conversation with him.
follows:
Q

In this regard Mr. Gillis testifies as

(T.R. page 76, lines 2 through 6).
Okay. Did this officer or did this person on the phone,

did Mr. Reid ask you to pay any money when he talked to you?
A

He did not ask me to. When he said he was the Officer,

he was talking to my mother at that time.

(Emphasis added).

Mr. Gillis then testifies that he turned the telephone over to
his mother and upon doing so told her bhat it was the Defendant on
the telephone pretending to be a police officer. "His testimony in
this regard was as follows:
Q

(T.R. page 74, lines 14 through 24).

And when you got your mother to get on the phone, did you

tell her that it was Mr. Reid on the phone?
A

I said it's Mr. Reid and he's pretending to be a police

officer is what I said.
Q

Did you sit there while she talked on the phone?

A

Yes.

Q

And I assume that phone conversation ended shortly

I did.

thereafter?
A

Yes.

It did.

The prosecution

then

continued

its

line

regarding how the caller had identified himself.

of

questioning

In this exchange

Mr. Gillis contradicts his earlier testimony where he claimed that

16
the caller did not identify himself as an officer and indicates the
caller identified himself by two different names, a sergeant West
and then an Officer Briddem.
follows:
Q

His testimony in this regard was as

(T.R. page 75, lines 8 through 25, and page 76, line 1).
Okay. Do you remember if there were any names used, did

he tell you what his name was, officer so and so or anything like
that, or how he identified himself?
A

It was Officer West was the Sergeant I think it was.

Q

Okay.

A

And the Officer he said he was is Briddem.

Q

Okay. And do you remember how to spell that, or did you

ask for it to be spelled or was it just Briddem?
A

My mother asked how is was spelled and it was B-R-I-D-D-

Q

Okay.

E-M.

Officer Briddem?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A.

Yes.

But that's who you —

you heard him say it was

(Emphasis added.

But you knew it wasn't Officer Briddem didn't

you.

However, Mr. Gillis' later testimony again contradicts his
previous statements on how the caller identified himself.

Mr.

Gillis now testifies that he was not listening to the conversation
when the caller identified himself as Officer Briddem.

It is also

worth noting in this exchange that Mr. Gillis' acknowledges that
the caller does not attempt to have him "submit" to or "rely upon"
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the caller's pretended official authority an element of the offense
with which the Defendant is charged. His testimony in this regard
was as follows:
Q

(T.R. page 76, lines 2 through 11).

Okay. Did this officer or did this person on the phone,

did Mr. Reid ask you to pay any money when he talked to you?
A

He did not ask me to. When he said he was the Officer,

he was talking to my mother at that time.
Q

Okay.

So you — you — but you weren't listening at the

conversation at that point?
A

No.

Q

You could only hear your mom talk?

A

Yeah.

In an effort to further clarify Mr. Gillis1 inconsistent
testimony the Court interposes some questions of its own in an
attempt to clarify its obvious confusion.

In this exchange Mr.

Gillis claims that the caller did not identify himself by name
contrary to his previous testimony however, this testimony is
consistent with his original testimony on this issue.

(T.R. page

80, lines 17 through 22).
Q

All right. Mr. Gillis, before you step down, I just have

a couple of questions. During the conversation in which according
to you it was Mr. Reid who identified himself as a police officer,
he did not use the name of an individual; is that right?
A

He did not.

Then in an obvious attempt to rehabilitate the witness the
prosecutor follows with questioning regarding the statement Mr.
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Gillis just made that the caller did not use any name during the
telephone conversation with him.

(T.R. page 80, lines 5 through

12) .
Q

I'm a little confused after that question.

Mr. Gillis,

just one more question.
A

Did he use the name of an Officer though?

Did he tell

you his name was Officer so and so when he talked to you?
Q

I do believe he did.

A

And that's the Briddem that you gave us?

Q

Yeah.

However, we note that even in this exchange Mr. Gillis
equivocates in his answer by saying that "I do believe he did" when
responding to the question as to whether the caller identified
himself by name and that he was an Officer.
After that exchange the Court again is confused by Mr. Gillis'
testimony causing the Court to seek further clarification on the
issue as to how the caller identified himself to Mr. Gillis.

In

this exchange Mr. Gillis again contradicts his previous testimony
as to how the caller identified himself. (T.R. page 82, lines 2
through 11).
Q
confusion.

Okay.

Mr. Gillis, let's see if you can now resolve my

I apologize for the interruption.

Mr. Gillis, am I

correct if I were to say that when you first answered Mr. Stoney's
questions that you said that the caller may have identified himself
as Officer Briddem, but that he made such an identification of
himself to your mother, and that he didn't give a name in reference
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to you?
A

I was on the phone at the time that he said his name as

Officer Briddem.
The prosecution then called Mr. Gillis1 mother Vicky Green as
its second witness• Ms. Green testified that she had in fact never
spoken or met the Defendant before her telephone conversation on
August 11, 1994.

Her testimony in this regard is as follows:

(T.R. page 83, lines 11 through 13).
Q

Now have you ever met Mr. Reid before, ma!am?

A

No.

I have not.

Ms. Green next testifies that her son came to her and gave her
the phone indicating that the caller wished to speak to her. Her
testimony in this regard is as follows:

(T.R. page 83, lines 14

through 21).
Q

Do you recall on that day receiving a phone call, on

August 11th I believe, receiving a phone call where someone
identified himself as a police officer to you?
A

Yes.

I do.

Q

Just prior to that time, did your son come and notify you

that you were wanted on the phone?
A

Yes.

Ms, Green then testifies that she spoke with the caller who
identified himself as an Officer Briddem.
regard is as follows:
Q
time?

Okay.

Her testimony in this

(T.R. page 84, lines 2 through 14).

Did you talk on the phone then at that point in
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A

Yes.

Q

What happened when you answered the phone?

A

I said hello and he said this is Officer, and he kind of

mumbled.

I couldn't quite understand him.

And I said excuse me

and then he said his name again, he said Officer Briddem, and I
asked him if he could spell it.
Q

And did he spell it?

A

He did spell it for me.

Q

And how did he spell it for you?

A

B-R-I-D-D-E-M.

Ms. Green then recounted the conversation she had between
herself and the caller.
follows:
A

Her testimony in this regard was as

(T.R. page 85, lines 2 through 15).
At that point in time he told me that my son had been

accused of slashing tires at the apartment complex by the Security
Officer, and I had —

and he said that Brandon (Gillis) needed to

either pay the Security Officer money or charges would be pressed
and the people —

Jessie's family would be evicted out of the

apartment complex.

And I told him that was not my problem what

they did with Jessie and his family, but if he wanted to press
charges against Brandon that that's what would need to be done, but
Brandon was not going to be paying any money.
The prosecution then proceeds to have Ms. Green identify the
Defendant as the caller.
follows:
Q

In this regard, Ms. Green testifies as

(T.R. page 87, lines 2 through 11).
And you've heard now Mr. Reid speak here today, and I
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realize it's been a long time and you may or may not be able to
recognize his voice.

Can you tell us if it sounds the same or if

it's him or not?
A

Actually, because I had only talked to him the one time,

but as soon as I heard him speak here today, it sounded very
familiar.
Q

Okay.

Could you say for sure if it was him or not?

A

I think yes, it was.

Clearly reliance upon the testimony of Mr. Gillis and Ms.
Green

in

establishing

the

corpus

delicti

of

the

charge of

impersonation of an officer against this Defendant is error and an
obvious mistake.
doubt

cannot

The Court's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable

be

inconsistencies

justified

when

considering

of Mr. Gillis' testimony

and

the

freguent

the unreliable

identification of Ms. Green.
First, Mr. Gillis' identification of the caller is fraught
with reasonable doubt and does not support the verdict in this
matter.

Not only does the foregoing establish that the caller

never attempted to have Mr. Gillis1 submit or rely upon his
pretended official authority but Gillis' testimony is also highly
suspect in establishing whether the caller ever identified himself
as an officer to Mr. Gillis.
Mr.

Gillis

contradicts his testimony

on

four different

occasions as to whether the caller ever identified himself as an
officer. This contradiction also extended to the issue of whether
the caller identified himself by name and what name he used. When
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the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt such obvious
inconsistencies cannot support a verdict of guilty.

This Court

should without pause be able to reach a "definite and firm"
conviction that a mistake has been made."
Upon further scrutiny of Mr. Gillis1 testimony a seemingly
subtle but no less important fact stands out that also calls into
question the reliability of Mr. Gillis1 testimony which the trial
Court either ignored or failed to focus on. When Mr. Gillis first
testified concerning his call allegedly to the Defendant, he
testified that when the party whom he believed to be the Defendant
answered his call he greeted him with the salutation of West Valley
Police Department. What is remarkable about this testimony is the
highly improbable likelihood that the Defendant could anticipate
that the call which came to his number was placed by Mr. Gillis and
he having anticipated the same would have answered his telephone
"West Valley Police Department" (T.R. page 73, lines 2-9). When
considering the other inconsistencies in Mr. Gillis1 testimony this
improbable exchange calls into question the reliability of any of
this witnesses testimony and should further obviate that the trial
Court's reliance on Mr. Gillis1 testimony was a mistake and that
the subsequent verdict was against the clear weight of evidence.
Secondly, while Ms. Green testified that the caller identified
himself as a police officer and apparently attempted to get Ms.
Green to submit or rely upon his pretended official authority by
requesting that her son reimburse the Defendant for his slashed
tires the circumstances surrounding her identification are highly
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unreliable. As the foregoing testimony demonstrated Ms. Green had
prior to August 11, 1994 never met or spoke with the Defendant.
Her identification of the Defendant in Court on March 30, 1995, was
based solely upon her apparent recognition of the Defendant's voice
in the courtroom from one brief telephone conversation which
occurred almost eight months previous.

Further, Ms. Green's

testimony concerning her identification is equivocal in nature.
Her testimony in this regard is as follows: (T.R. page 87, lines 2
through 11).
Q

And you've heard now Mr. Rcid speak here today, and I

realize it's been a long time and you may or may not be able to
recognize his voice.

Can you tell us if it sounds the same or if

it's him or not?
A

Actually, because I had only talked to him the one time,

but as soon as I heard him speak here today, it sounded very
familiar.
Q

Okay.

Could you say for sure if it was him or not?

A

I think ves, it was.

(Emphasis added).

The testimony of Ms. Green is highly unreliable and cannot in
and of itself justify a verdict of guilt in a criminal case
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The eight months which
elapsed between the brief conversation she purportedly had with the
Defendant and her recognition of his voice as that of the caller on
August 11, 1994 is not only highly unreliable but improbable. Even
when considering Ms. Green's testimony in conjunction with the
testimony of Mr. Gillis the verdict cannot be justified.

Mr.
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Gillis own equivocation on the issue of identity of the caller
cannot be seen to bolster in anyway Ms. Green's identification of
the Defendant as the caller.
CONCLUSION
The holding in the Baklov decision establishes unequivocally
that before the trial Court can permit a Defendant to exercise his
constitutional privilege of self-representation it must conduct a
colloquy on the record wherein the Court ascertains whether the
Defendant possesses adequate intelligence und knowledge about the
potential ramifications of voluntary self representation.

The

Court's failure to do so is reversible error and should result in
the Defendant being granted a new trial.

The record being devoid

of any such colloquy mandates that the verdict be set aside and the
matter remanded back to the trial Court for a new trial.
While the verdict in a bench trial in a criminal case is given
great deference, the holding by this Court has established a
verdict obtained which is against the clear weight of evidence or
which results through mistake should not be permitted to stand.
The record in this matter obviates that the verdict is against the
clear weight of evidence and is a mistake.

Furthermore, the

absence of specific findings by the trial Court to support its
verdict should weigh heavily when considering how much deference to
extend to its verdict.
Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the verdict of
the trial Court be set aside and that this matter be remanded to
the trial Court for a new trial.

DATED

this

js
/>
/<
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day of April, 1996.
Respectfully submitted,
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